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Abstract 
This paper revisits the issue of exchange rate regimes in emerging Asia. It is divided into two 
main parts. The first part compares de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes in Asia over 
the decade 1999–2009. It finds that while Asia is home to a wide array of exchange rate 
regimes, there are signs of gradual movement towards somewhat greater exchange rate 
flexibility in many of the regional countries. However, the propensity for foreign exchange 
intervention and exchange rate management among regional central banks remains fairly 
high in many instances. Beyond a general reluctance of many Asian economies to allow for 
a “benign neglect” of their currencies both in terms of managing volatility as well as in terms 
of  “leaning  against  the  wind,” the sustained stockpiling of reserves in developing and 
emerging Asian economies since 2000 (interrupted only briefly by the global financial crisis) 
suggests that they are more sensitive to exchange rate appreciations than to depreciations. 
This is the focus of the second part of the paper. We find there  to be evidence of an 
apparent “fear of appreciation”  which is manifested in asymmetric exchange rate 
intervention—i.e., a willingness to allow depreciations but reluctance to allow appreciations. 
This policy of effective exchange rate undervaluation is rather unorthodox from a 
neoclassical sense, but is consistent with a development policy centered on suppressing the 
price of non-tradable goods relative to tradables (i.e., real exchange rate undervaluation). 
The paper concludes with a few observations on the management of Asian currencies in 
light of the global financial crisis and concerns about global imbalances. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Maintaining a stable and “competitive” exchange rate has been one of the cornerstones of 
Asian industrialization strategies starting with Japan in its high-growth period from 1950–73, 
and largely emulated by the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea) and some of the other 
newly industrializing economies (NIEs) in the 1970s and 1980s. The “near NIEs” in 
Southeast Asia—Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, which had effectively pegged their 
currencies to the US dollar—benefitted significantly from a revaluation of the Japanese yen 
following the Plaza Accord of 1984–85 as Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) moved 
offshore to maintain export competitiveness. This flood of Japanese FDI helped kick-start 
growth in the region, which continued until the Asian crisis in 1997. More recently, the 
People’s Republic of China’s (hereafter, PRC) devaluation of the yuan in January 1994, and 
its continued peg to the US dollar until recently, has, it has been argued, helped transform 
the country into the world’s factory and export powerhouse.   
This paper revisits the issue of exchange rate regimes in emerging Asia.
1
However, beyond a general reluctance of many Asian economies to allow for a “benign 
neglect” of their currencies both in terms of managing volatility as well as in terms of “leaning 
against the wind,” the sustained stockpiling of reserves in developing and emerging Asian 
economies since 2000 (interrupted only briefly by the global financial crisis) suggests that 
they are more sensitive to exchange rate appreciations than to depreciations. This is the 
focus of the second part of the paper (Sections 4 and 5). Section 4 empirically explores the 
particular issue of this asymmetry in exchange rate intervention in developing and emerging 
Asia. We find there to be evidence of an evolution of Asian exchange rate policy towards an 
apparent “fear of floating in reverse” or “fear of appreciation” (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
2007). This policy of exchange rate undervaluation is rather unorthodox, and at odds with 
most neoclassical/mainstream wisdom,  which likely would  recommend  that  policymakers 
aim to keep the real exchange rate (RER) as close as possible to its equilibrium level, as any 
sort of misalignment could in theory create macroeconomic disruptions. Specifically, 
according to conventional wisdom, RER overvaluation stifles economic growth and export 
competitiveness while persistent undervaluation leads to inflationary concerns. Section 5 
reconsiders the PRC’s and East Asia’s unorthodox development, which has been centered 
on suppressing the price of non-tradable goods relative to tradables (RER undervaluation).   
 The paper is 
divided into two main parts. The first part of the paper (Sections 2 and 3) compares the de 
jure  and  de facto  exchange rate regimes in selected emerging Asian economies.  An 
enduring question in the literature on exchange rate regimes is: how do official classifications 
compare with de facto  regimes? The  paper  facilitates this comparison by  presenting  an 
analysis of the degree of de facto exchange rate flexibility in the exchange rate regimes for 
emerging Asian economies. To preview the main conclusion, it is evident that Asia is home 
to a wide array of exchange rate regimes, though there are signs of a gradual movement 
towards somewhat greater exchange rate flexibility in many of the regional countries. 
Nonetheless, the propensity for foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate 
management among regional central banks remains fairly high in many instances, 
particularly in terms of managing against a currency basket (i.e.,  maintaining a stable 
nominal effective exchange rate, or NEER).  
The final section concludes with a few observations on Asian currency management in light 
of the global financial crisis and concerns about global imbalances. 
                                                 
1 We limit ourselves to a subset of Asian currencies for which comparable data are more easily available: 
Bangladesh, PRC, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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2.  EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN DEVELOPING AND 
EMERGING ASIA
2
2.1  De Jure Classifications 
 
Until 1998 it was fairly easy to obtain de jure exchange rate classifications, as this data was 
compiled from national sources by the IMF.
 Specifically, between 1975 and 1998, the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions was based on self-
reporting of national policies by various governments, with revisions in 1977 and 1982. Since 
1998—and in response to criticisms that there can be significant divergences between de 
facto and de jure policies—the IMF’s exchange rate classification methodology has shifted to 
compiling unofficial policies of countries as determined by the Fund staff.
3 While the change 
in IMF exchange rate coding is welcome for many reasons (including the fact that the new 
set of categories is more detailed than the older one), the IMF no longer compiles a list of 
the de jure regimes. The only way this can be done is by referring to the website of each 
central bank or other national sources individually, and wading through relevant materials. 
The results are summarized in Table 1.
4
As is apparent, the de jure exchange rate regimes in Asia span a wide spectrum. Many 
smaller Asian economies appear to prefer some form of single currency pegs. This is true of 
Hong Kong, China (whose currency board arrangement is pegged to the US dollar), as well 
as others like Brunei (pegged to the Singapore dollar) and Bhutan and Nepal (pegged to the 
Indian rupee) and Myanmar (pegged to Special Drawing Rights, or SDR). In contrast, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in South Asia and the East and Southeast Asian economies of 
Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines officially operate flexible exchange rate regimes. The 
flexible exchange rates in the three  East Asian countries are accompanied by inflation-
targeting frameworks. Thailand too operates an inflation targeting arrangement, though it 
defines itself officially as a managed floater. Table 2 summarizes some key components of 
the inflation targeters in Asia.
 
5
A number of other Asian countries have adopted a variety of intermediate regimes (currency 
baskets, crawling bands, adjustable pegs, etc.). For instance, according to the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI), India “monitors and manages the exchange rates with flexibility without a fixed 
target or a pre-announced target or a band, coupled with the ability to intervene if and when 
necessary.”
 
6 Viet Nam officially maintains a crawling peg and band around the US dollar. 
Singapore officially manages its currency against a basket of currencies, with the trade-




 While Singapore’s currency basket regime follows a more strategic orientation, 
both PRC and Malaysia in July 2005 officially shifted to what may be best referred to as a 
more mechanical version of a currency basket regime (i.e., keeping the trade-weighted 
exchange rate within a certain band as a goal in and of itself). Pakistan seems to operate 
rather ad hoc adjustable pegs. Overall, therefore, it is readily apparent that “one size does 
not necessarily fit all” when it comes to the choice of exchange rate regimes in Asia.  
                                                 
2 This section is based on Rajan (2010). 
3 The data has since been applied retroactively to 1990. 
4 The descriptions in Table 1 are mostly direct quotes from official sources and not paraphrased by the authors. 
5 Roger (2009) offers a useful overview of the achievements and challenges faced by countries that have 
adopted inflation targeting frameworks over the last two decades. 
6 See Cavoli and Rajan (2009, Chapter 4) for an analysis of India’s exchange rate regime. 
7 See Cavoli and Rajan (2009, Chapter 5) for an analysis of Singapore’s exchange rate regime. ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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2.2  De Facto Classifications 
As noted, the IMF has replaced its compilation of de jure exchange rate regimes with the 
behavioral classification of exchange rates. The new IMF coding is based on various 
sources, including information from IMF staff, press reports, other relevant papers, as well as 
the behavior of bilateral nominal exchange rates and reserves.
8  As is apparent from a 
comparison of Tables 1 and 3, there is no discrepancy between the de jure and de facto 
regimes of Hong Kong, China, which operates an  exchange rate fixed to the US dollar. 
Similarly, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, and Thailand are categorized as managed 
floaters, broadly consistent with their official pronouncements. Korea and the Philippines are 
characterized as independent floaters, consistent with their official assertions but somewhat 
odd in view of the fact that both countries have been rapidly building up reserves. There are, 
however, divergences from the official pronouncements. According to the public statements 
of the PRC’s authorities, the exchange rate regime is a based on a currency basket, though 
the IMF classifies the PRC’s system as a crawling peg.
9 Viet Nam is classified as having a 
conventional fixed peg regime compared to its official pronouncement of maintaining a 
crawling peg and band around the US dollar. Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka have 
also been characterized as managed floaters (with no predetermined exchange rate path), 
despite their official declarations of being independent floaters.
10
3.  DE FACTO EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
  Overall, with a few 
exceptions, most developing and emerging Asian exchange rate regimes are, according to 
the IMF, either completely fixed (soft or hard) or managed. 
11
This section presents a measure that has been recently used in Frankel and Wei (2007) as a 
way of incorporating exchange rate regime flexibility (or fixity) into the original Frankel-Wei 
(2004) method for inferring implicit basket weights.   
 
3.1  Model 
Consider the following: 
 




where  Δe  is defined as the (log difference of the) local currency per some independent 
numeraire—here we use the SDR
13
                                                 
8 Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) appears to be the intellectual basis for the IMF de facto regimes. Also see 
Barajas, Erickson and Steiner (2008) for a summary overview of the various methodologies to classify 
exchange rates regimes. 
—and Δr is the monthly change in net foreign assets 
9 See Eichengreen (2006) who provides a broader discussion of issues surrounding the PRC’s currency and its 
exchange rate regime.  
10 There is an interesting question as to why many countries in Asia and elsewhere have a “fear of declaring” 
they are fixed or managed, especially since there is no clear-cut evidence that markets punish countries with 
de facto or de jure fixed rates in terms of demanding higher sovereign spreads. If anything, the opposite seems 
to be the case (Barajas, Erickson, and Steiner 2008) 
11 This section is based on Cavoli and Rajan (2010). 
12 This is the same index used by Frankel and Wei (2007). However, they use the term “EMP index” as opposed 
to “intervention index.” ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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(IMF IFS, lines 11–16c) scaled by lagged money base (line 14).
14
   
 To see how equation 3.1 
relates to the choice of exchange rate regime,  we need to use an intervention index  to 
augment the original Frankel-Wei method as follows: 
Δet = α0 + α1 ΔUSt + α2 ΔJPt + α3 ΔEUt  + γ Intervention_Index + μt
 
    (3.2) 
The α coefficients in equation 3.2 are often interpreted as implicit currency weights. The G3 
currencies (in log differences) of US dollar, euro, and the yen (all per the SDR) are chosen, 
as they represent world currencies deemed to exert sufficient influence on the local 
currency. While it is tempting to interpret these coefficients as potential basket weights, it is 
probably more prudent for them to be interpreted as “degrees of influence,” as it is very 
difficult to say whether a high and significant coefficient value implies a basket currency, or 
merely market-driven correlations.
15
Under equation 3.2, as γ → 1 the exchange rate per local currency becomes more flexible 
as the intervention index converges to the dependent variable, Δe, and the α coefficients 
should be close to zero and/or statistically insignificant. As γ  →  0,  the exchange rate 




3.2  Results 
  
We use monthly data for the period 1999:m2 and 2009:m9, or some sub-periods thereof 
depending on data availability.
17 Two samples are presented for each country: one including 
and one excluding the final two years of the sample where results may reveal the effect of 
the recent global financial crisis (Table 4).
18
By and large the US dollar is the currency that has the greatest degree of influence on local 
currencies. Results do not change much when we truncate the sample to the pre-global 
crisis period, with the exceptions of Korea and India, the two countries initially impacted by a 
reversal of global capital flows. In essence,  both central banks allowed much greater 
exchange rate flexibility during the crisis, and this shows up in terms of much higher US 
dollar weights pre-crisis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
13 The idea behind using the SDR revolves around finding a currency that is not excessively related to any of the 
currencies used in this study. A common choice in this literature has often been the Swiss franc, but there are 
concerns that its strong correlation with the euro may bias parameter estimates. 
14 Reserve differences are scaled by lagged domestic monetary base in order to compare the magnitude of the 
reserve change in relation to the stock of money base in the system. The result is an index that is more easily 
interpretable than if absolute values are taken. 
15 It is also for this reason that we did not impose the restriction that all the currency weights should add up to 
one, or for that matter, why we do not just restrict the parameters to take values between 0 and 1 (as there 
may be more complex correlations that we might know about a priori). 
16 In our estimations we do not impose any constraints on the γ coefficient; thus, it could exceed one or be 
negative. 
17 Two caveats should be noted. One, we prefer lower frequency data in terms of month-to-month changes, as 
there is too much noise in low frequency data (day-to-day or month-to-month). High frequency data tends to 
tell us more about ad hoc interventions to minimize volatilities as opposed to degrees of influence of G3 
currencies. In addition, the data on reserves are only available on a monthly basis, so there is a practical 
dimension to our choice as well. Two, reserve values could change because of currency fluctuations and, 
ideally, we should exclude these effects before estimation. However, this is not possible since we lack data on 
the currency composition of reserves. This may impact the precision of the results in some cases. 
18 Time dummies were also used with little success. As such, we decided that presenting two sets of results will 
show more explicitly the effect of the crisis on the exchange rate. ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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With the exceptions of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Viet Nam, the intervention index is 
statistically significant and therefore open to interpretation. The values are all under 0.1 in 
the cases of the PRC, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, and close to zero 
in many cases, suggesting there exists a high deal of fixity in the local currencies (vis-à-vis a 
single currency or basket of major currencies). The intervention index has a slightly stronger 
economic weight in Indonesia and India, suggesting these two economies allowed relatively 
greater exchange rate flexibility than the others. The pertinent question here is,  to what 
extent are these weights market-driven versus policy targets?  
We can attempt to answer this by summarizing the interaction between the currency weights 
and the intervention index. We focus first on those currencies with intervention indices that 
are at or close to zero and are statistically significant. The PRC’s case is the most clear-cut 
with the US dollar weight at 1, implying continued heavy exchange rate management.
19 The 
US dollar weights for the Bangladesh taka, Sri Lankan rupee, and the Philippine peso are 
surprisingly large, suggesting a high degree of fixity. While this is consistent with the IMF’s 
categorization of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as both having conventional fixed peg 
arrangements, it is at clear odds with the Philippines being described as operating an 
“independent floating” arrangement. Thailand and Singapore also have low and statistically 
significant intervention indices but with far lower US dollar weights and some positive and 
statistically significant weight to other currencies. This is indicative of management against a 
currency basket, consistent with the official proclamations by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) as well as an oft-noted desire for currency basket pegging by the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT). Both are broadly defined by the IMF as being managed floaters.
20
Two other currencies characterized as managed floaters by the IMF are India and Indonesia. 
As noted, both have relatively higher intervention indices, suggestive of a greater degree of 
exchange rate flexibility. The currency weights for Indonesia suggest it is market-driven, as 
the α coefficients are either statistically insignificant (US dollar and euro) or zero/negative 
(yen). The Indian rupee appears to have a degree of flexibility in the exchange rate with a 
possible loose US dollar peg. The intervention index measures for Korea, Malaysia, and 
Pakistan are all statistically insignificant, implying there is insufficient evidence from the 
intervention index coefficient to suggest the existence of any systematic exchange rate fixity 
over the sample period under consideration. However, examining the α coefficients, one 
notes a high degree of influence of the US  dollar  and  negligible  influence of the other 
currencies for Malaysia and Pakistan, suggesting that both countries manage their 
currencies against the US dollar.  
  
To further check whether there has been a change in the degree of intervention/flexibility in 
Asia over time, we undertake recursive least squares estimates for the US dollar coefficient, 
α1. The recursive estimates are generated by running the regression for equation 3.2 
iteratively—beginning with k observations and recording the coefficient values until we reach 
the full sample.
21
                                                 
19 The weight on the US dollar declines marginally if we consider the sub-period from 2006. 
  Figures 1a-b show the recursive coefficients for the US dollar for the 
inflation targeting countries versus the remainder of the countries sampled (the non-inflation 
targeters). Generally, the influence of the US dollar is lower for the inflation targeting group 
than for the other group, as would be expected a priori. Figures 2a-c suggests that the 
degree of influence of the US dollar is high across the board. While this is anticipated with 
the conventional fixed peggers, we would expect the US dollar peg to have been lower for 
the floating pair of Korea and (especially) the Philippines. Figure 2b for the managed floaters 
is broadly consistent with that regime choice. The exchange rates in those countries with a 
20 However, the lack of statistical significance of the non-US dollar-weighted currencies is odd. 
21 k is the number of regressors. Due to insufficient degrees of freedom we discard the first few coefficient 
values—about three years’ worth.  Recursive OLS is a special case of the Kalman Filter modeling strategy with 
time-varying coefficients. These results are typically consistent with the rolling fixed window regressions where 
one would drop the oldest observation before incorporating the most recent.   ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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lower US dollar coefficient value—namely, Singapore and Thailand—are also influenced by 
other currencies, while the others tend to be influenced more exclusively by the US dollar. 
 
Figure 1: Recursive Least Squares Estimates for the US dollar Weight 
   
1a: Inflation Targeting Countries 
 
 




Source Cavoli and Rajan (2010). ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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Figure 2: Recursive Least Squares Estimates for the US dollar Weight 
 
2a: Independent Floaters 
 
 




Source: Cavoli and Rajan (2010) 
 ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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2c: Conventional Fixed Peggers 
 
 
Source: Cavoli and Rajan (2010). 
4.  ASYMMETRY IN ASIAN EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES 
The foregoing analysis makes apparent that, by and large, Asian currencies remain fairly 
heavily managed—mostly  against the US dollar,  but sometimes against a basket of 
currencies. The additional fact that the region has rapidly built up reserves implies the 
currencies are effectively undervalued, presumably in order to sustain export-led growth. 
This in turn has contributed to a massive reserve accumulation in emerging Asian 
economies as well as to ongoing global macroeconomic imbalances. In other words, 
whereas Calvo and Reinhart (2002) noted that exchange rate policy in the 1990s in 
emerging economies was best characterized as “a fear of floating,” we conjecture that Asian 
exchange rate regimes in the 2000s can be more precisely described as being a “fear of 
appreciation” or a “fear of floating in reverse,” a term initially coined by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2007). Somewhat surprisingly, there has been scant discussion of this 
possible asymmetry in foreign exchange market intervention in the debate over de facto 
exchange rate regimes in Asia, a gap that this section attempts to fill.
22
4.1  Central Bank Intervention Reaction Function
 We first outline a 
simple model of optimal central bank behavior,  which derives a simple central bank 
intervention reaction function as our estimating equation.  
23
As noted, our focus is on managed floaters in Asia—specifically,  India,  Korea,  the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,  and Indonesia—which are generally assumed to allow 
balance of payments pressures to be partly reflected in exchange rate changes and partly in 
foreign exchange intervention and corresponding reserve changes. More formally, the 
central bank is assumed to have full and direct control over a proxy measure of intervention 
 
                                                 
22  Two notable exceptions are Ramachandran and Srinivasan (2007) and Srinivasan, Mahambare, and 
Ramachandran (2008), who find evidence in the Indian context that support the existence of asymmetric 
foreign exchange intervention (Indian rupee per US dollar). 
23 Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are based on Pontines and Rajan (2011). ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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defined as the percent  changes in foreign exchange reserves (rt). The central bank 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market to minimize the  following inter-temporal 
criterion:
24
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where δ is the discount factor and Lt
                       
 is the period loss function. We follow Surico (2008) and 
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where  λ  > 0 is the relative weight and γ  is the asymmetric preference parameter on 
exchange rate stabilization. et
0 2
2 < + = ∂ ∂ ] ) )( / ( [ ) ( / t t t t e e e L γ λ
 denotes the percent change in the exchange rate, r* is the 
optimal level of reserves,  and  e* is the central bank’s target exchange rate,  which is 
assumed to be zero in this case. If γ < 0, deviations of the same size but opposite sign yield 
different losses and, thus, the rate of appreciation is weighted more heavily than the rate of 
depreciation. Analytically, , for et
Two points of clarification should be noted. With regard to the issue of why the level of 
reserves as opposed to deviation matters, we can never of course be sure, as central banks 
do not make clear their objectives. That said, one might argue that central banks are actually 
quite sensitive about declines in reserves as they may be viewed by markets as a sign of 
some concern or weakness (for instance, see Bird and Rajan 2003). In relation to this, the 
fact that many regional central banks rapidly rebuilt their reserves once the crisis abated 
further adds to the conjecture that central banks arguably are very concerned about the 
actual reserve levels. By equating e* to zero, we are assuming the choice by countries of a 
fixed exchange rate regime, which is admittedly a simplifying assumption. That said, it is 
fairly clear in some instances, such as Singapore, that the central bank targets a particular 
level (within a range) as opposed to a rate of depreciation per se. In any case, making the 
theoretical framework more general would not necessarily add much, if any, value to the 
empirical results.  
 < 0.  
It is assumed that interventions can reduce the rate of change (depreciation/appreciation) in 
the exchange rate. Accordingly,  
 
   t e ~  – e* = a0 + a1Rt + εt                                                               
 
                 (4.3) 
where a1 > 0 and the error term, εt
2
ε σ
, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with 
zero mean and variance  . Minimizing equation 4.2 by choosing Rt
  
  subject to the 
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Replacing expected values with actual values, the empirical version of the intervention 
reaction function can be simplified as follows: 
                                                 




                                      t t t t v ) e ~ ( e ~ c R + + + =
2 β α                    (4.5) 
 
where α = -λa1 and β = -λa1
4.2  Results 
γ/2. The reduced form parameters [α,β] allow us to identify the 
asymmetric preference on exchange rate stabilization, γ. It can be shown that the 
asymmetric preference parameter is γ  = 2β/α. This parameter is the main concern of our 
empirical exercise in the next section (Surico 2008 and Srinivasan, Mahambare,  and 
Ramachandran 2008). 
Our estimation is based on monthly data for the sample period between 2000:m1 and 
2009:m7 for six emerging Asian economies:  India,  Korea,  the  Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Indonesia (largely the same set as in Section 3, excluding the non-Indian 
South Asian economies of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, as well as Malaysia and 
the PRC, which maintained US dollar pegs until late 2005, and Viet Nam, which also has a 
strong and growing de facto  US dollar peg). This was the period of rapid stockpiling of 
reserves in the region (i.e., after the Asian crisis of 1997–98), including the global financial 
crisis of 2008–9,  which started to have an impact on developing and emerging Asian 
countries’ balance of payments by early to mid-2008. 
The variables used in the estimation are as follows: the US federal funds rate, rt = (∆log 
Reservest t e ~ )*100 and   = (∆log et)*100 with et
As implied earlier, equation 4.5 is the main equation of interest in the empirical test.
 being the nominal exchange rate (US dollar 
per domestic currency) and the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), respectively, such 
that a rise in each of these two alternative definitions of the nominal exchange rate denote a 
currency appreciation, and vice versa. The data are sourced from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics except for the NEER, which is sourced from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS).  
25 Table 
5  reports the estimates of the intervention reaction function as well as the asymmetric 
preference parameter. For each country we present two sets of results: Row (1) using the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate (US dollar per domestic currency) and 
t e ~
Row (2) using the 
NEER. The J test indicates that the hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions is never 
rejected. The parameters on   and α are statistically different from zero in all cases. Of 
primary interest to us is the parameter on the squared  t e ~ -- the β coefficient. This is because 
testing the restriction that H0: β  = 0 is akin to testing H0
What are our prior expectations of the γ, the asymmetric preference parameter? As noted in 
Section 4.1, a rise in the nominal bilateral exchange rate (NEER) denotes an appreciation, 
implying γ should be positive. The asymmetric preference parameter is significantly positive 
when either the nominal US dollar per domestic currency exchange rate or the NEER is 
used as the measure of the exchange rate (rise implies appreciation). This implies that the 
central banks of these countries appear to react differently to appreciation and depreciation 
: γ  = 0. β is significant in all 
countries.  
                                                 
25 The orthogonality conditions implied by the inter-temporal optimization-rational expectations paradigm make 
the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach the appropriate method of estimating equation 4.4. We 
follow Hansen (1982) and use an optimal weighting estimate of the covariance matrix that accounts for both 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms. Hence we report robust standard errors. For the most 
part, constant, lagged values (1 to 10, 12, and 15 months ) of rt, et, as well as current and lagged values (1 to 4, 
8, and 15 months ) of the US federal funds rate are used as instruments. ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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pressures. More to the point, the responses of central banks in these countries to rates of 
appreciation are much stronger than to rates of depreciations of the same value.
26
The estimated asymmetric parameter is also much higher in the case of the NEER than the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate for three of the  six countries examined--namely, India, 
Singapore, and Thailand. For these three countries, the asymmetric preference parameter, γ, 
ranges from 0.23 for India to  a high of  0.71 for Singapore when the nominal bilateral 
exchange rate is used, and from 0.69 for India to 4.57 for Thailand when the NEER is used.  
The estimates of the asymmetric preference parameter for these same three countries are 
about two (Singapore), three (India), and seven (Thailand) times larger when the NEER is 
employed as the regressor  in the intervention reaction function compared to when the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate is used. This implies that these three economies tend to pay 
more attention to managing their effective exchange rate than the US dollar rates. This is 
consistent with other studies that have estimated the degree of influence of major currencies 
on the Asian economies since the Asian crisis and have found evidence of loose pegging to 
a basket with the Japanese yen and euro also influencing movements in the Asian 
currencies beyond the US dollar (as discussed in Section 3). Once again, while this finding 
for Singapore is consistent with the fact that it officially pursues a “Basket, Band, and Crawl” 
(BBC) regime, with a basket essentially referring to the NEER, two other countries in the 
region, Thailand and India,  are also believed to operate a de facto  currency basket 
arrangement.  
  
5.  EXCHANGE RATE UNDERVALUATION 
Many emerging Asian economies have, like Japan, remained circumspect about allowing for 
a freely floating regime and continue to manage their currencies heavily both to “lean against 
the wind” as well as to manage short-term currency volatility.
27 With regard to the latter, 
given the heavy reliance of Asia on external trade, FDI, and capital flows, the obvious desire 
by many Asian policymakers to minimize currency volatility (quite apart from leaning against 
the wind) is understandable, even if the theoretical and empirical evidence linking currency 
volatility  to  trade, investment,  and growth is not  unambiguous (Eichengreen 2009 and 
Schnabl 2007).
28
Leaving aside for now the rather voluminous issue of the impact of currency volatility, we 
focus on the issue of currency undervaluation, which is arguably more controversial given its 
cross-border repercussions (“beggar-thy-neighbor” and global imbalances). In particular, we 
offer a simple analytical exposition of some of the issues relating to the PRC, East Asian 




                                                 
26 We have also tried the estimations for smaller sub-periods, such as the pre-global financial crisis period (until 
early or mid-2008), and the results remain intact. 
 
27 There may even be a degree of endogeneity in the sense that as countries “learn to float,” they gain a greater 
degree of monetary policy autonomy (see Hakura 2005). Of course, if unrestrained monetary policy has been a 
facet of a country’s past, imposing exchange rate fixity may be an advantage as it constrains the active use of 
monetary policy. 
28 There are technical issues in terms of how exchange rate volatility is measured, whether certain outliers drive 
the results, differentiating between volatility and valuations, and the underlying causes of volatility, among 
other questions. 
29 We assume for simplicity a common terms-of-trade between importables and exportables such that they can 
be combined into “tradables.” ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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5.1  Defining the Real Exchange Rate
30
To understand the issue of real exchange rate undervaluation it would be useful to remind 
ourselves that the real exchange rate (RER) can be decomposed into two sets of relative 
prices: the  relative price of traded goods between countries (so-called  “price 
competitiveness”) and the relative price of tradables and non-tradables within a country. The 
(log) aggregate price index can be expressed as a weighted  average of the price of 
tradables (T) and non-tradables (NT): 
 
 
   for the domestic country           (5.1) 
and,         
    for the foreign country.          (5.2) 
 
Then the RER, q = s + p* − p, can be written as the sum of the relative price of traded goods 
(a) and the relative price of non-traded goods (b). 
              




* ) ( ) (
b
T N T N
a
T T p p p p p p e q − − − + − + = α β           (5.3) 
where   and   
Given the increasing degree of trade openness of economies to international trade flows, it is 
likely that the Law of One Price in traded goods tends to hold over time (at least among the 
East Asian economies). If this is the case, the RER is primarily a reflection of relative prices 
of tradables and non-tradables  and thus has implications for both  internal resource 
allocations as well as external repercussions (on global imbalances).
31
One  simple, albeit highly imperfect, proxy for the  RER would be the ratio of the 
Wholesale/Producer Price Index or WPI/PPI (a broad measure of tradables) vis-à-vis the 
Consumer Price Index or CPI (which consists of a  significant share of non-tradables).
 
32 
Figure  3 reveals  that while there have been some fluctuations in this ratio over the last 
decade, these movements have been within a rather narrow range of 6% or so either way. 
Given the extraordinarily rapid growth of the economy during this period (9.5% on average 
between 1998 and 2009),
33
                                                 
30 Sections 5.1-5.3 are based on Rajan and Beverinotti (2011).  
 the lack of discernible appreciation of the real exchange rate 
suggests a significant degree of undervaluation (we return to this point later in the paper).  
31 The empirical literature estimating variations in the real exchange rate (RER) is mixed at best. For instance, 
Chinn (2000) finds some East Asian RERs (Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore) to be co-integrated 
with relative prices, while others (the PRC, Indonesia, and Thailand) are not. Parsley (2007) finds that about 
60% of the variations in bilateral real exchange rates in East Asian bilateral exchange rate movements can be 
explained by variations in the relative price of tradables and non-tradables. See Rajan and Beverinotti (2011) 
and the literature cited within.  
32 Of course, not all components of the PPI (or WPI, for that matter) are tradable, and not all components of the 
CPI are non-tradable. A somewhat more precise measure could be to examine the ratio of the trade index (i.e., 
exports plus imports) to CPINT, (i.e., the consumer price index of those components that are non-tradable). 
However, even such a measure is not without its problems. Specifically, even when many goods are tradable, 
not all of them are actually traded (see Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008). 
33 According to the World Bank World Development Indicators.  ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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Figure 3: PRC Real Exchange Rate, 1998–2010 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 
5.2  Mean Reverting Real Exchange Rate: No Growth Effects 
Assume that the country was initially running a balanced current account and produces and 
consumes at point 1, where production ( X ) is equal to consumption (C ) for both products 
(  and  ), as in Figure 4. The slope of the budget line is given by the 
relative price of tradables to non-tradables—i.e.,  ,  ) 1 ( * *
* s p e p T T + = where  , i.e.   is 
the domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, 
*
T p  is the world price of tradables, and s 
is the per unit net subsidy on domestic non-tradables.
34
 
   
Figure 4: Non-distorted Equilibrium 
 
Source: Rajan and Beverinotti (2011).  
                                                 
34 Think of s as being the net of per unit tariff on imports and subsidy (financial or otherwise) to domestically-
produced tradable goods (exports and/or import-competing goods). ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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A RER undervaluation (accomplished via nominal devaluation, subsidies, tariffs, etc.) leads 
to a steeping of the budget line (Figure 5). The rise in the relative price of tradables leads to 
a shift of domestic resources to that sector away from non-tradables (point 2) and a 
corresponding fall in the consumption of tradables ( ) and rise in the consumption of non-
tradables ( ) (point 3).
35 As can be seen, at the new equilibrium,   (  and  ). 
Thus, the excess production of tradable goods is exported overseas (especially to the US), 
helping East Asia generate large and sustained trade surpluses (defined as excess 
production over consumption of tradables). These trade surpluses in turn led to a massive 
infusion of global liquidity and kept global credit conditions exceptionally loose, financing—
and possibly contributing to—the  trade and current account deficits abroad and the 
consequent global imbalances.
36
Figure 5: Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation in a Static Setting 
 However, on its own, the process would not persist forever. 
 
Source: Rajan and Beverinotti (2011).  
As noted, at this new equilibrium,  . Thus, the conundrum is why this 
undervaluation of relative non-tradables prices persisted; by lowering the production of non-
tradables relative to consumption, why was its price not pushed up relative to tradables—the 
so-called “mean reversion of the real exchange rate”?
37
Conventional wisdom has been that the East Asian economies were able to keep a lid on the 
domestic demand for non-tradables via financial repression,  which kept domestic credit 
reined in while maintaining a high degree of fiscal restraint (since government expenditures 
 
                                                 
35 We assume here that substitution effect outweighs the income effect such that    rises. 
36 While one school of thought argues that the US current account deficit was financed via capital inflows, the 
other school of thought, led by Ben Bernanke (2005), has argued that the global savings glut overseas led to 
large-scale capital inflows into the US, causing lower long-term interest rates, increased consumption and 
investment, and contributing to the worsening current account deficit. Also see Blanchard and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2009) and Wyplosz (2010). 
37 There is a burgeoning literature that attempts to test if real exchange rates are mean-reverting. For instance, 
see Gil-Alana (2000) and Jorap (2009). ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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tend to fall overwhelmingly on non-tradables).
38 As can be seen from Figure 6, this implies a 
leftward parallel shift of the budget line until we are back to a point on the PPC like point 2, 
where the economy produces at point  . However, consumption is reined in to a 
point such as 2’ where there is no disequilibrium in the non-tradables sector and the 
economy continues to run a current account surplus ( ) . Notice that compared to the 
original point 1 (where there is no intervention), at point 2’ the economy consumes relatively 
less of both tradables and non-tradables, implying that welfare must be lower (lower 
indifference curve). In other words, in the absence of any market failures, any government 
intervention must be welfare-reducing.
39





Source: Rajan and Beverinotti (2011).  
 While this combination of macroeconomic policies (real exchange rate undervaluation and 
demand contraction) was clearly used by the PRC and its East Asian neighbors, given the 
rapid pace of infrastructural and real estate development and overall credit growth in that 
region, one would be hard-pressed to argue that demand for non-tradables was as heavily 
suppressed as some economists have suggested. While the non-tradables sector may not 
have grown as rapidly as the tradables sector, it has, nonetheless, grown quite rapidly 
(Barnett and Brooks 2006). How does one reconcile this seeming discrepancy? Of course, 
the easy answer would be that these countries—the PRC, most notably—have an abundant 
supply of rural labor looking for work in the fast-growing manufacturing sector, and this labor 
surplus  helped contain the wage costs and kept the price of non-tradables down. This 
                                                 
38 Of course, another way countries were able to keep the prices of non-tradables down was via direct price 
controls, though this merely transforms the problem from one of prices to that of quantities and rationing 
(Huang and Tao 2010). 
39 It is plausible that point 2’ could be located below point 1, implying consumption of non-tradables is the same; 
but at point 2’, the consumption of tradables is lower than point 1, still implying lower welfare. ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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phenomenon—the so-called Arthur-Lewis “classic dual-sector model,” where wages are set 
in the rural sector as supply of labor—is almost perfectly elastic.
40 However, while this may 
have been true in the early stages of industrialization, most data suggests that wages started 
rising fairly quickly.  Cai Fang (2007), for instance, has argued that the PRC has already 
reached  a  “Lewis turning point,”  and  that  there will  be significant upward pressures on 
industrial wages.
41
But there is the broader question as to why, in the era of non-commodity based currencies, 
countries would ever want to bias production towards the tradables sector, let alone run 
trade surpluses at the seeming expense of overall consumer welfare.
 
42
5.3  Dynamic Growth Effects and Market Failures 
 The obvious answer 
here would be that, from a growth perspective, the demand for non-tradables is limited by 
the size of the domestic market and is relatively inelastic, while that for exportables is highly 
elastic. However, the problem with this line of reasoning is that if market forces were allowed 
to operate on their own, the price of non-tradables would fall relative to tradables, leading to 
a sectoral resource reallocation without any need for government intervention in the form of 
currency undervaluation. The same point holds true if, as some have argued, export markets 
are more dynamic and allow a country to rapidly move up the value-added chain. This 
implies that the relative price of tradables will rise even more rapidly vis-à-vis nontradables 
and lead to a natural movement of resources from non-tradables to tradables without any 
need for government intervention.     
Rodrik (2008) has offered an explanation/justification for the East Asian countries’ 
undervaluation policies. He argues that one must go beyond the usual (static) resource 
reallocation effects, instead  emphasizing  dynamic gains from favoring export-linked 
manufacturing. These benefits could be in the form of learning-by-doing and demonstration 
effects that are external to the firm. Thus, left to themselves, markets would under-produce 
such goods and government intervention could jump-start growth via RER undervaluation to 
internalize these externalities. In other words, RER undervaluation could act as a form of 
industrial policy, helping to rapidly propel East Asian economies into global manufacturing 
powerhouses.
43
The foregoing possibility is outlined more formally in Figure 7 below. The starting point is as 
before. To be more specific, the economy is initially in equilibrium at point 1 and the RER 
undervaluation changes the composition of consumption and production, generating a trade 
surplus and excess demand of non-tradables. We know from previous explanation that this 
would not be sustainable without demand compression. However, assume now that there 
are growth effects that make possible an outward movement of the production frontier.
 Taking this argument further, by channeling resources into the production of 
tradables, there may also be some positive productivity spillovers to the non-tradables sector 
helping to keep the output of that sector up despite the relative decline in its price. In other 
words, there may be dynamic expansionary effects which balance, if not outweigh, the static 
contractionary effects.  
44
                                                 
40 For a recent review of the model, see Kirkpatrick and Barrientos (2004). 
 In 
the case where the economy experiences growth  effects, the economy could be in an 
equilibrium such as point 5 where the production and consumption of both tradables and 
41 Zhao (2010) offers a useful discussion of the predicament and policy concerns regarding migration of the 
PRC’s rural workers to the country’s urban and industrializing areas.  
42 More precisely, as noted later, the issue of biasing production towards tradables and running a trade surplus do 
not always go hand-in-hand. 
43 The Rodrik story is elaborated upon in a more sophisticated model by Korinek and Serven (2010) who show 
how undervaluation can help firms internalize “learning by investing” spillovers in a two-factor model. 
44 The economy can produce the same amount of non-tradables, and more tradables with the same quantity of 
resources, or even more of both goods if externalities spill over from the tradables to nontradables sectors.  ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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non-tradables rise, thus unambiguously increasing overall welfare (point 5 being northeast of 
point 1).  
Figure 7: Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation with Dynamic Growth Effects 
   
Source: Rajan and Beverinotti (2011).  
As before, if the country wanted to run a trade surplus for whatever reason, it would require 
a degree of contractionary aggregate demand policies such that consumption is below the 
production frontier. The important point, though, is that even at point 5’ it is plausible that the 
consumption of both tradables and non-tradables is higher than the initial equilibrium (point 
1). What we have not explained is why the authorities would want to run a trade surplus (i.e., 
choose point 5’,  which is welfare-inferior to point 5). In fact, many East Asian countries 
began the process of effectively subsidizing the tradables sector far  before they started 
running trade surpluses.  Broadly,  Aizenman and Lee (2008) refer to the former (i.e., 
supporting tradables, especially exports) as “financial mercantilism” and the latter (i.e., trade 
surpluses and reserve hoarding) as “monetary mercantilism.” The latter may be due to a 
desire to build up net foreign assets for precautionary purposes as a “war chest” against 
future crises (see, for example, Caroll and Jeanne 2009 and Durdu et al. 2008), or the neo-
mercantilist belief that exports are special (as opposed to tradables more generally) (Korinek 
and Serven 2010). 
6.  CONCLUSION  
This paper has examined the de facto exchange rate regimes in emerging Asia. There is 
some evidence indicating a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility in the regional 
economies. However, there is still a high level of fixity to the US dollar regardless of the de 
jure exchange rate regime.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) conjectured that exchange rate policies have evolved 
towards an apparent “fear of floating in reverse” or “fear of appreciation,” whereby 
interventions have been aimed at limiting appreciations rather than depreciations. Our 
results confirm the existence of an asymmetry in central bank foreign exchange intervention 
responses to currency appreciations versus depreciations in many developing and emerging 
Asian economies, particularly in the case of nominal effective exchange rates (NEERs). This ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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in turn rationalizes the relative exchange rate stability as well as the sustained reserve 
accumulation in the region.
45
The paper went on to explore how real exchange rate undervaluation in much of East Asia 
led to sectoral reallocation of resources, which may in turn have helped transform them into 
industrial and export powers. In the scenario outlined in this paper, if there are positive 
externalities from producing tradables, which might also benefit the non-tradables sector
  
46
The dynamic growth story based on externalities from producing more tradables as outlined 
above  is unlikely to be valid forever. It is generally believed that the productivity of the 
tradables sector will outpace that of non-tradables and real wages will have to start rising 
over time as the country develops. The PRC has clearly been feeling intense price pressures 
in recent times.
, it 
is plausible that the country is able to produce and consume more of both tradables and 
nontradables simultaneously. While the country would still need to curb domestic demand if 
it desires to run a trade surplus, we have shown that it could still be in a welfare-enhancing 
position compared to the case where the markets were able to operate freely. This seems to 
be a plausible growth story for East Asia and PRC. Of course, these policies have also 
contributed to external imbalances with the US as well as globally. However, from the PRC’s 
perspective, why would it consider changing its policy stance now if this undervalued RER-
based development strategy has indeed been so successful? 
47
Ouyang, Rajan, and Willett (2010) and Ouyang and Rajan (2008) analyzed these issues for 
the PRC and India, respectively (pre-global financial crisis), and found that both countries 
had been able to effectively sterilize a high proportion of their recent reserve increases. If, 
however, the reserve build-up persists unabated and the fiscal costs of sterilization begin to 
escalate (Calvo 1991), it is unlikely that the regional monetary authorities can persist with 
aggressive sterilization on such a huge scale.
 Indeed, a number of commentators have expressed concerns that such 
large-scale intervention runs a serious risk of generating increases in inflation in the 
intervening countries, and some have even suggested that such reserve accumulations have 
played a major role in the creation of excessive global liquidity. Key to such issues is the 
extent to which monetary authorities can successfully sterilize the domestic monetary effects 
of reserve accumulation. Most monetary models of the exchange rate and balance of 
payments assume no sterilization so that large reserve accumulations would automatically 
lead to rapid growth in domestic money and credit. Sufficiently high levels of international 
capital mobility would make effective sterilization impossible, no matter the intensity of efforts 
of the domestic monetary authorities.  
48
A more sustainable strategy would be to allow its RER to appreciate somewhat and reorient 
production and consumption towards non-tradables. If so, the PRC’s undervaluation policy 
and its hitherto export-led growth paradigm may have reached its limits. Further yuan 
revaluation along with expansion of domestic demand is likely necessary going forward. With 
 In such a situation domestic macroeconomic 
stability could be compromised. However, this effective undervaluation of the currency and 
the consequent bias towards external demand as opposed to domestic consumption may 
need to be reconsidered, particularly in view of the decline that is likely to occur in the trend 
growth in the US and rest of the industrialized world over the medium-term.  
                                                 
45 This is not to suggest that the policy was implemented mechanically at all times. Countries in Asia—India, 
Korea, and Indonesia, most notably—allowed for greater currency flexibility during the 2007–8 periods when 
there were concerns of commodity-induced inflation. 
46 Of course, stating that there may be market distortion is easy; providing specific evidence is a much tougher 
proposition. 
47 Anecdotal evidence pointing to wage-price pressures and labor unrest in the PRC is growing (for instance, see 
Peaple 2010 and The Economist, 10 June 2010). 
48 The World Bank (2005) and Mohanty and Turner (2005) discuss the latter two costs, and Rodrik (2006) 
discusses the issue of opportunity costs. These costs need to be balanced against the likelihood that higher 
reserve holdings reduce a country’s perceived international credit standing, hence lowering the country’s risk 
premium. ADBI Working Paper 322    Rajan 
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regard to the latter, substantial increases in domestic demand in the PRC would require 
domestic structural reforms, including removing domestic cost distortions, upgrading 
domestic financial markets and safety nets, as well as reducing retained earnings of firms.
49 
With regard to the former, the announcement by  the  PRC  on  19  June 2010 that it will 
abandon its currency peg to the dollar and manage the yuan more flexibly against a currency 
basket should be viewed in this context.
50
What does a more flexible (and presumably stronger yuan) imply for the rest of Asia? The 
dynamics between the PRC’s real exchange rate and the rest of the region is complex. For 
instance, while it is commonly believed that a real exchange rate appreciation of the yuan 
would benefit some other Asian economies with broadly similar comparative advantage 
(e.g., India and Viet Nam), allowing them to gain global market share, it could also hurt 
others in the region as the  PRC’s imports from the region might decline as production 
networks between the PRC and Southeast Asia move elsewhere (Garcia-Herrero and Koivu 
2009).  
  
Regardless of whether the PRC’s exports are a substitute or complement to other Asian 
economies, there appears to be a prisoner’s dilemma with regard to exchange rate policies 
in Asia, which in turn implies that there may be potential benefits from pursuing a more 
coordinated approach to dealing with monetary and exchange rate policies in the region.
51
                                                 
49 See Goldstein and Lardy (2009), Huang and Tao (2010), and OECD (2010) for discussions on structural 
reforms needed in the PRC. Qiao and Song (2009) offer a detailed overview of the PRC’s savings rate. 
 
Certainly,  coordination does not imply straight-jacketing all countries in the region to a 
common exchange rate regime. More specifically, rather than adopting a single currency 
immediately, Asian economies might  gradually move towards pegging to a currency 
basket—starting with individual currency weights and varying extents of flexibility around the 
pegs with a gradual convergence over time. 
50 See the People’s Bank of China: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6400&id=1488. It is important to 
keep in mind that the PRC did make a similar announcement on 21 July 2005, when it started allowing the 
RMB to gradually appreciate vis-à-vis the US dollar. That policy was put on hold from July 2008 as the PRC 
returned to a firm US dollar peg with the onset of the global financial crisis because of concerns about export 
and growth slowdown and global deflation. See Frankel (2009) for an empirical evaluation of the PRC’s 
exchange rate regime. 
51 Park (2006) elaborates on the prisoner’s dilemma in East Asia and the central role played by the PRC.  
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